Metz, France

General

Normal security patrols continued in effect after receipt of the initial vulnerability test warning, at 0400Z 27 May 59.

At 1000Z 27 May upon receiving the announcement of Stage III Sabotage Alert from the officer i/c test team the unit alert plan was put in effect in accordance with the unit War (Emergency) Plan. Full call out of all personnel was required to properly man defensive positions on a continuous basis. Extra guards were posted at 1100Z and by 1200Z 7 guards and two spotters were in position at the main site, 3 each at the TX, RX and Main Power Plant and 2 at the Standby Power Plant. These guards positions were manned for the remainder of the exercise and personnel rotated approximately every two hours.

In addition the unit AFP carried out normal front gate entry control at the main gate and roving patrols in the area outside of the enclosures around each site. Two of the guards at the main site were positioned with radios in the woods at the rear of the T-80. The Defence Force HQs at the main site had telephone communications to al guard areas except to those with which they had radio contact. (See above).

Operational effectiveness of the unit was reduced progressively by the simulated destruction of TX and RX radio equipment until air/ground communications was reduced to 6 channels of VHF located at the main site. (vs 30 VHF, 6 UHF normally). The loss of the Standby Power Plant, TX transmitters site and one of the two high voltage cables servicing the main site did not decrease the unit capability as TX, RX and main sites have standby diesels in position to carry on under complete loss of main power.

Unit comments are as follows:

1. The need for brush and grass cutting at the main site and the expansion of part of the perimeter fence has been apparent for some time and is the subject of outstanding SU/Metz A for Ps.
2. The need for another fence at each of the Power Plants giving more depth to the property is under investigation.
3. Additional concertina wiring for the RX site is presently available however lack of metal stakes in Air Division is holding up the project.
4. Brush clearing at the TX and RX sites is included in an outstanding SU/Metz A for P.
5. Better training and more efficiency positioning of guards at the remote sites is required and will be accomplished. This will include defence in greater depth.
6. Repositioning of lights at the remote sites to darken the defence area but lighten the approaches is now planned.
7. The joint use of the RX site by four organizations (61 Sqn, 601 Sqn, 4 ATAF and SU Metz) requires an area security plan as stated in the security report and early action will be taken on this problem.

1. The vulnerability test was excellent training for unit personnel and an ideal opportunity to exercise unit security plans.
2. The need for additional training and supervision of guards and increased area patrols was apparent.
3. The requirement to expedite brush clearing and fencing must be recognized if security staffs are able to cope with the difficult defensive task assigned.
4. The security defects outlined by the officer i/c test team are correct and acknowledged.

(GF Ockenden) W/C
CO, 61 Squadron, RCAF